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SEC v. LEVINE: DETERMINING THE
FATE OF DISGORGED ASSETS
OBTAINED IN SETTLEMENT
The Securities Exchange Act of 19341 (Act) was enacted to pro-
tect investors from unfair practices and strengthen credibility in
the securities market system.' Under section 4(a) of the Act, Con-
gress established the Securities and Exchange Commission3 (SEC)
15 U.S.C. § 78b (1988). The section provides in pertinent part:
For the reasons hereinafter enumerated, transactions in securities as commonly con-
ducted upon securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets are affected with a
national public interest which makes it necessary to provide for regulation and con-
trol of such transactions and of practices and matters related thereto, including
transactions by officers, directors, and principal security holders, to require appro-
priate reports, to remove impediments to and perfect the mechanisms of a national
market system for securities transactions and the safeguarding of securities and
funds related thereto, and to impose requirements necessary to make such regula-
tion and control reasonably complete and effective, in order to protect and make
more effective the national banking system and Federal Reserve System, and to issue
the maintenance of fair and honest markets in such transactions.
Id.
The constitutionality of the Act flows from the commerce clause of the Constitution. See
American Power Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 96-98 (1946) (all provisions of Act are to be
read to eliminate evils connected with holding companies involved in interstate commerce).
2 See Securities Exchange Act preamble, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (act to prevent unfair prac-
tices and secure credibility in the market). See also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,
230 (1988) (court noted importance of full disclosure to maintain honest market system);
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976). Court recognized purposes of 1934
Act were "to protect investors against fraud" and "to promote ethical standards of honesty
and fair dealing." Id. The dual purpose of 1934 Act was to provide for regulation of the
securities market and to protect investors. Crofoot v. Sperry Rand Corp., 408 F. Supp.
1154, 1156 (E.D. Cal. 1976); S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 13 (1934). "[T]he
initiative and responsibility for promulgating regulations pertaining to the administration .
. . remain with the exchanges . . . where they fail adequately to provide protection to the
investors the Commission is authorized to step in and compel them to do so." Id.; Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 130 (1973) ("[iut is thus clear
that the congressional aim in supervised self-regulation is to insure fair dealing and to pro-
tect investors from harmful or unfair trading practices."); 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 322 (reaffirms protective purpose and amends for further protection). See generally
JENNINGS & MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 52 (6th ed. 1987). The
SEC has a duty to enforce federal securities laws including possible violations of the 1934
Act. Id.; Thomforde, Negotiating Administrative Settlements in SEC Broker-Dealer Disciplinary
Proceedings, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 237, 239-51 (1977) (means, practices and policies underlying
Commission's settlement negotiations and disciplinary actions).
' 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (1988) provides in part: "There is hereby established a Securities
and Exchange Commission to be composed of five commissioners to be appointed by the
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which is authorized to review all securities and exchange prac-
tices4 and to implement disciplinary action where needed.'
In recent years, the courts have been subjected to a sharp rise
in the number of insider trading disputes." In response, recent
legislation has broadened the SEC's authority to impose and en-
force civil and criminal penalties for insider trading conduct.7
President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate ...." Id.
15 U.S.C. § 78f (1988) (exchanges cannot be registered, and would operate unlawfully
See 15 U.S.C. § 78e (1988) (unless rules of exchange conform to Commission's rules and
meet Commission's review). See, e.g., Thomforde, supra note 2, at 239 n.8 (cites wide vari-
ety of other sources from which Commission draws its authority). See also Silver v. New
York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963) (by exercise of authority Commission can
request exchanges to modify rules and disapprove of rules adopted by exchanges). The
Commission has authority to extend regulatory powers over savings and loan issociations
in the event of fraud. Id. at 350. Cf Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 986
(2d Cir.) (provisions of Securities Exchange Act apply to many transactions outside Ameri-
can markets), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975). See generally Jennings, Self-Regulation in the
Securities Industry: The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 29 LAW & CONTEMP.
PRoBS. 663, 670 n.51 (1964) (SEC is both regulator and disciplinarian of market inequities).
' See C.E. Carlson, Inc. v. SEC, 859 F.2d 1429, 1438 (10th Cir. 1988) (SEC has primary
responsibility to impose sanctions for violations of 1934 Act); Quinn & Co. v. SEC, 452
F.2d 943, 947 (10th Cir. 1971) (Commission, not courts, is primarily responsible for pro-
tection of investors), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972). Broad discretion to apply sanctions
for violations of the securities transactions belongs to the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion. Id. See also SEC v. Warner, 652 F. Supp. 647, 648 (S.D. Fla. 1987) ("Congress exer-
cises no control over the actions of the Commissioner of the SEC."). But see Foremost-
McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232, 259-60 (1976) (where views of Com-
mission are inconsistent with intent of Congress, no deferential treatment afforded);
United Housing Foundation Inc., v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 858 n.25 (1975) (agency's de-
terminations will be given considerable weight, however, when inconsistent, no special
weight accorded to the agency's views). See generally Jennings, supra note 4, at 670 (discus-
sion of SEC as disciplinarian); Werner, The SEC as a Market Regulator, 70 VA. L. REV. 755,
770-79 (1984) (SEC highly visible in antifraud actions).
0 Bahls, This Little Piggy Went to Market, STUDENT LAW. October 1989, 19-20 (most recent
cases have involved multi-million dollar securities). See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646,
648-49 (1983) (officer of brokerage firm received information from corporate insider that
reports of its assets had been grossly exaggerated); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222, 223-24 (1980) (petitioner acquired names of takeover target companies and subse-
quently bought stock in those companies reaping huge profits); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d
197, 199-204 (2d Cir. 1984) (affirming conviction for insider trading through information
obtained as proofreader at financial printer's office), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985). See
generally Carlton & Fishel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 872-82
(1983) (arguments in favor of prohibitory insider trading and suggests that it is efficient to
compensate corporate managers); Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA.
L. REV. 1, 1-28 (1980) (restrictions on insider trading and enforcement process).
I See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1988). The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforce-
ment Act of 1988 provides in pertinent part:
Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged in or is
about to engage in acts or practices constituting a violation of any provision of this
chapter, the rules or regulations thereunder, the rules of a national securities ex-
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One sanction commonly used is disgorgement, an equitable rem-
edy whereby a defendant is compelled to forfeit the funds by
which he was unjustly enriched.8
Recently, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals specifically fo-
cused on the SEC's utilization of disgorgement for insider trading
allegations in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Levine.9
In Levine, the SEC filed a complaint against Dennis Levine alleg-
ing insider trading activities in violation of sections 10(b) and
14(e) and rules 10(b)-5 and 14(e)-3 of thie Act.' Levine subse-
change or registered securities association of which such person is a member or a
person associated with a member, the rules of a registered clearing agency in which
such person is a participant, or the rules of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking
Board, it may in its discretion bring an action . . . to enjoin such acts or practices,
and upon a proper showing a permanent or temporary injunction or restraining or-
der shall be granted without bond.
Id. See generally, Goelzer & Berueffy, Insider Trading: The Search for a Definition, 39 ALA. L.
REV. 491, 494-95 (1988) (in addition to civil liability defendant may be subject to criminal
liability of up to $100,000 and imprisonment for up to five years or both (citing 15 U.S.C.
§ 78ff (a) (Supp. IV 1986, amended by 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1988)) (increased fines up to
$1,000,000 and imprisonment for up to 10 years or both))).
The drafters of the new legislation expressed an intention that the courts should be in-
ventive with respect to the insider trading doctrine. Langevoort, The Insider Trading Sanc-
tions Act of 1984 and Its Effect on Existing Law, 28 CORP. PRAC. COMMENT. 89, 90-91 (1986-87)
(originally published in 37 VAND. L. REV. 1273 (1984)). The decisions in an insider trading
action should reflect a result-oriented approach with a focus on a wide range of abuses. Id.
at 91.
See SEC v. Blavin, 557 F. Supp. 1304, 1316 (E.D. Mich. 1983), affd, 760 F.2d 706 (6th
Cir. 1986). "The deterrent effect of the SEC enforcement action would be greatly under-
mined if securities law violators were not to disgorge illegal profits." Id.; SEC v. Manor
Nursing Ctrs., 458 F.2d 1082,..1105-06 (2d Cir. 1972) (proper exercise of district court's
equity powers to order refunding of proceeds illegally obtained); Janigan v. Taylor, 344
F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir. 1965) (when no speculation that defendant made profit, and "profit
was proximate consequence of fraud," it is more appropriate to give defrauded party bene-
fit of windfalls rather than allow fraudulent party to obtain them). See also Marcus v. Otis,
168 F.2d 649, 660 (1948) (Hand, J. concurring) ("[W]rongdoers should also pay over all
profits so that they will not benefit in any manner from their wrong.").
' SEC v. Levine, 881 F.2d 1165 (2d Cir. 1989). Appeals were taken by Dennis Levine,
Robert Wilkis, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the New York State Department of
Taxation and Finance and Arden Way. Id. This Comment will focus only on the appeal
made by Levine and the IRS.
" Id. at 1168; SEC v. Levine, 689 F. Supp. 317 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), affd in part rev'd in
part, 881 F.2d 1165 (2d Cir. 1989). See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) and 78n(e) (1988). Section 78j
provides:
that is unlawful to use the means of interstate commerce or the mails to use any
"manipulative or deceptive devices" in the sale or purchase any security, whether
registered or not. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). Section 78n(e) provides that it is unlawful to
misrepresent, omit, or use deception with any material fact in connection with
tender offers or solicitation of security holders connected with the offer. Also, the
Commission has authority to define and prescribe means to prevent such fraudulent
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quently agreed to a settlement of the charges,11 consenting, inter
alia, to disgorge approximately $11.5 million. 2 Meanwhile, in a
separate action, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) levied against
Levine's assets for federal income tax liabilities on unreported in-
come. 3 The district court approved the settlement agreement be-
tween the SEC and Levine and entered a Judgment by Consent,
leaving distribution of the assets contingent upon an SEC distribu-
tion plan to be approved by the court. 4
In its decision to approve the distribution plan, the district
court rejected a claim presented by the IRS and Levine proposing
that the IRS would have priority over Levine's disgorged assets
upon distribution." The district court, sitting in equity to review
the distribution plan, determined that the funds never "be-
longed" to Levine, and imposed a constructive trust. 6 In viewing
the funds as "embezzled or misappropriated," Levine was treated
as a holder of "bare legal title" who served as a trustee for the
activities.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982).
Levine faced violations of trading based on use of material non-public information, de-
frauding investors and breach of fiduciary duty. Brief for Appellant at 32-34, SEC v. Le-
vine, 881 F.2d at 1168 (2d Cir. 1989) (No. 88-6294).
" Levine, 881 F.2d at 1170. Levine agreed to the entry of a permanent injunction
prohibiting him from buying or selling securities while he was in possession of material
non-public information. Id. at 1169. He also promised to give full cooperation in any other
investigations by or on behalf of the Commission. Id.
"2 Id. Levine consented to a disgorgement of $11.5 million to a receiver to satisfy any
and all claims against him arising from the sale or purchase of the securities which were
alleged in the Commission's complaint. Id. at 1169.
13 Id. at 1168-69. The IRS had been investigating Levine's federal income tax liabilities
for the years prior to 1986. Id. "On May 23, 1986, an $11 million assessment for tax
liabilities including deficiencies, interest and penalties was issued for the years 1983
through 1985 and a lien for $8.5 million" was obtained. Id.
" SEC v. Levine, 689 F. Supp. 317, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). On June 5, 1986 the court
signed the Proposed Judgment, and it was entered as the judgment of the court. Id. The
judgment ordered Levine to comply with the terms of the Consent and to disgorge the sum
described therein. Id. The original distribution plan proposed to allocate 58% of the availa-
ble disgorgement fund to investors and 42% to the appropriate tax authorities. Brief for
Appellee at 11, SEC v. Levine, 881 F.2d at 1168 (2d Cir. 1989) (No. 88-6294). The district
court rejected the plan after it determined a constructive trust should be imposed on the
funds. Id. An amended distribution plan which, after payment of administrative expenses,
called for all remaining disgorged trading profits to be allocated to investors was approved
by the court. Id.
" Levine, 689 F. Supp. at 321.
16 Id. at 320-22. See infra notes 54-59 and accompanying text (discussion of constructive
trust).
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benefit of the defrauded investors."7
On appeal, the IRS and Levine challenged the district court's
order that denied the attachment of the federal tax lien through
the imposition of a constructive trust on the disgorged assets. s
Reversing the district court's determination, the court of appeals
held that since the transactions leading to the SEC's allegations
amounted to voidable rather than void contracts, Levine had
property rights in the disgorged assets to which the federal tax
lien could attach, thus the IRS was entitled to preferential
treatment.19
This Comment will discuss the SEC's regulatory authority and
ability to effectuate the purposes of the Act. It will also examine
the analysis of the court of appeal's decision and suggest reasons
for affirming the district court's decision.
I. THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION: REGULATION AND
ENFORCEMENT
The Securities and Exchange Commission is an independent,
quasi-judicial regulatory agency whose function is to preserve fair-
ness in security transactions and to uphold the integrity of the se-
curities markets."0 To achieve this aim, the SEC is responsible for
investigating possible violations of the securities laws." Once the
17 Id.
IS Levine, 881 F.2d at 1174-77.
Is d. at 1175.
,O See The Work of the SEC (Oct. 1986), reprinted in JENNINGS & MARSH, SECURITIES REGU-
LATION, CASES AND MATERIALS, at 37 (6th ed. 1987) (role and methods of enforcement of
the SEC); supra note 2 and accompanying text (SEC provisions are to promote fairness). See
also Freeman, A Private Practitioner's View of the Development of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 18, 19-28 (1959) (discussion of the early controversies
and decisions which shaped the course of the SEC); Lowenfels, Securities and Exchange Com-
mission Investigations: The Need for Reform, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 575, 579-82 (1971) (critiqu-
ing lack of supervision in investigations to ease judicial fact-finding exercise).
See 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1975) (SEC has power to make rules and regulations); 15
U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1980) (SEC has investigative authority). See also Cohen v. Wedbush, No-
ble, Cooke, Inc., 841 F.2d 282, 286 (9th Cir. 1988) (recognizing Commission's "plenary
authority over the arbitration procedures adopted by the national securities and exchange
associations"); Austin Mun. Sec. v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 757 F.2d 676, 680 (5th
Cir. 1985) ("[elvery self-regulatory organization must comply with the provisions of the
Exchange Act, its own rules, and the rules of both the SEC and Municipal Securities
Rulemaking Board."); cf. Sartain v. SEC, 601 F.2d 1366, 1372 (9th Cir. 1979) (where Com-
mission's case not supported by substantial evidence, court cannot overturn Commission's
findings (citing Pierce v. SEC, 239 F:2d 160, 162 (9th Cir. 1956))).
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SEC has concluded an investigation and notified the parties in-
volved of the alleged misconduct,2" it may then proceed, after an
administrative review," to bring an action in federal district court
to seek appropriate equitable relief. 4 Such relief is in the discre-
tion of the court, though deference is usually given to the SEC's
determinations. 5 The court is granted exclusive jurisdiction to af-
firm and enforce or set aside the SEC's findings," and may exer-
" See 15 U.S.C. § 78w(c) (1975) (prompt notice must be given of any adverse action
accompanied by written statement of reasons). Cf Wickham, Let the Sun Shine In!: Open-
Meeting Legislation Can Be Our Key to Closed Doors in State and Local Government, 68 Nw. U.L.
REV. 480, 481 (1973) (truly democratic nations should make all investigations by govern-
ment public so that citizen's have knowledge of government's activities).
23 See Mister Discount Stockbrokers v. SEC, 768 F.2d 875, 876 (7th Cir. 1985) (associa-
tions of security brokers have original jusrisdiction of all complaints regarding misconduct
and has authority to conduct hearings and discipline its members); Wolfson, A Critique of
the Securities and Exchange Commission, 30 EMORY L.J. 119, 161 (1981) (SEC has power to
request administrative hearings before administrative judges and to make criminal refer-
ences to Justice Department where appropriate). Cf Freeman, Administrative Procedures, 22
Bus. LAw. 891, 893 (1967) (since it is nearly impossible for SEC to hold hearings for every
case, investigator's recommendations for procedural actions are given great weight).
"' See 15 U.S.C. 8u(d) (1987) (Commission may bring action in proper district court to
enjoin or permanently restrain violative acts); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(a) (1988) (when it appears
to Commission that violation was made, Commission may bring an action for civil penalty).
Cf Jaeger & Yadley, Equitable Uncertainties in SEC Injunctive Actions, 24 EMORY L.J. 639,
639-44 (1975) (expressing concern over broad and varied considerations of enforcement
aim of SEC and unpredictable decisions espoused by courts).
"5 See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964) (federal courts have power to
grant all necessary remedial relief). It is the duty of the court to be alert to provide a
remedy as necessary to effectuate the congressional purpose of the Act. Id.; SEC v. Sha-
piro, 349 F. Supp. 46, 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (court has power to fashion appropriate relief to
effectuate purposes of securities laws), af'd, 494 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1974). See also SEC v.
Washington County Util. Dist., 676 F.2d 218, 227 (6th Cir. 1982) (district court may deter-
mine amount of remedy); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1307-08 (2d Cir.
1971) (SEC may properly request ancillary relief from court of equity to afford complete
relief), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971); SEC v. Keller Corp., 323 F.2d 397, 402 (7th Cir.
1963) (injunction not unreasonable abuse of discretion where defendants showed reasona-
ble likelihood of future violations). See generally Jacobs, Judicial and Administrative Remedies
Available to the SECfor Breaches of Rule 10(b)-5, 53 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 397, 400 (trial court
has discretion to fashion equitable remedy so long as it is meant to deter and not punish).
" See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1987). "The district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction
of violations of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder . . .". Id. See also
FSLIC v. Proud Excelsior Ltd., 664 F. Supp. 1405, 1421 (D. Utah 1987) (jurisdiction
under 15 U.S.C. § 78aa is proper where-defendant had minimum contacts with United
States); Security Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1318 (9th Cir. 1985)
(jurisdiction exists under Securities Exchange Act if defendant had sufficient minimum
contacts with United States); Semegen v. Weidner, 780 F.2d 727, 730 (9th Cir. 1985)
(same). See generally Hazen, Allocation of Jurisdiction Between the State and Federal Courts for
Private Remedies Under the Federal Securities Laws, 25 CORP. PRAC. COMMENT. 49, 50-66 (ana-
lyzing tensions between federal and state governments concerning jurisdictional questions).
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cise its broad discretionary power to fashion its own appropriate
remedy in accordance with SEC policy."
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION IN Levine
The district court treated the income from Levine's alleged mis-
conduct as though it were misappropriated or embezzled funds;
however, the court of appeals concluded that since the consent
judgment neither admitted nor denied the allegations made by
the SEC, there was no basis upon which the district court could
categorize it as such.28 Moreover, the court stated in dictum that
even if the allegations of the complaint were established, the dis-
trict court's determination that Levine did not have property
rights in the disgorged funds was patently incorrect. 9 The court
held that despite the language of section 29(b) of the Act, which
states that transactions that violate the Act are "void,"3 0 judicial
gloss has rendered them voidable at the option of the innocent
party."1 Furthermore, once a securities transaction is found to be
27 See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 328-30 (1943) ("[T]he essence of equity juris-
diction has been the power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mold each decree to the
necessities of the particular case."); Shapiro, 349 F. Supp. at 55, (court has power to fashion
appropriate relief to effectuate purposes of securities law). See also Washington County Util.
Dist., 676 F.2d at 227 (on remand, district court may determine amount defendant must
disgorge); Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d at 1307-08 (proper for SEC to request ancillary
relief from court of equity to afford complete relief). Cf. SEC v. Harwyn Indus. Corp., 326
F. Supp. 943, 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) ("adverse effect" of injunction remedy should be con-
sidered by district court in erasing its discretion); SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241, 250 (2d
Cir. 1959) ("Public interest, when in conflict with private, is paramount").
Where a defendant has wrongfully obtained funds, the district court's application of dis-
gorgement was clearly within the equity power of the district court. SEC v. Manor Nursing
Centers, 458 F.2d 1082, 1104 (2d Cir. 1972). When a court determines that a specific
statutory provision has been violated and frames an injunction in those terms, there is no
misuse of discretion. Id. at 1103. "It is for the federal courts to adjust their remedies so as
to grant the necessary relief where federally secured rights are invaded." SEC v. Levine,
881 F.2d 1165, 1174 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
28 Levine, 881 F.2d at 1174. "[Tjhere was neither an adjudication nor a concession to
ground the district court's premise that the disgorged assets were obtained as a result of
the unlawful conduct alleged in the SEC complaints." Id.
I d. at 1176-78.
'0 See 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1982). "[E]very contract made in violation of any provision of
this chapter or any rule or regulation thereunder . . . shall be void . I..." d. (emphasis
added). Cf Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (look to construction of statute to begin interpretation); SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d
1325, 1332 (5th Cir. 1978) (language of statute may evince clear congressional intent).
" Levine, 881 F.2d at 1176. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite, 396 U.S. 375, 381 (1970)
(simply because contract is unenforceable does not compel conclusion that contract is null);
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voidable, the federal court must then look to state law to deter-
mine the nature of the property rights, if any, acquired by the
actor;32 the court therefore looked to New York law. 3
Under New York law, the equitable title necessary for a federal
tax lien to attach remains with a party who acquired property
through a voidable transaction.34 In the court of appeals' view,
this provided the basis for granting priority over the disgorged
assets to the IRS.3
III. CHALLENGING THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
When a federal statute is violated, both the legal consequences
of the act and the available remedies must be ascertained through
an interpretation of federal law.3 6 Since the securities laws are ap-
plicable, it is posited that courts should look to the plain mean-
ing" of section 29(b) and its underlying purpose 8 to construe the
Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 278 F.2d 783, 792 (8th Cir. 1967) (§ 29 (b) should be
read as rendering contract voidable at option of innocent party).
32 See United States v. Durham Lumber Co., 363 U.S. 522, 526 (1960) (must look to
state law to determine property interest); Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 82 (1939)
(state law controls in determining interest of taxpayer); Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland
v. New York City Hous. Auth., 241 F.2d 142, 144 (2d Cir. 1957) (same).
" Levine, 881 F.2d at 1176.
N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 5201(b) (McKinney 1978). See Alexander v. Chase Manhat-
tan, 61 App. Div. 2d 537, 539, 403 N.Y.S.2d 21, 22 (1st Dep't 1978) (judgment creditor
may only proceed against property which debtor maintains recognizable interest); M.F.
Hickey Co. v. Port of New York Auth., 23 App. Div. 2d 739, 739-40, 258 N.Y.S.2d 129,
130 (1st Dep't 1965) (judgment debtor is only liable to amount of property interest debtor
has in contract).
"' Levine, 881 F.2d. at 1176.
3 See Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942). State law is
"inapplicable to those areas of judicial decision within which the policy of the law is so
dominated by the sweep of federal statutes that legal relations which they affect must be
deemed governed by federal law having its source in those statutes, rather than by local
law." Id.; Prudence Realization Corp., v. Geist, 316 U.S. 89, 95 (1942) ("In the interpreta-
tion and application of federal statutes, federal not local law applies.").
31 See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 109 S. Ct. 2166, 2172 (1989)
(starting point for interpretation of statute is always its language); Caminetti v. United
States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (meaning of statute is sought first in language of act, and
if its meaning is plain, and within constitutional authority, courts' function is to enforce it).
See also Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The Plain Meaning Rule and Statutory Interpretation in
"Modern" Federal Courts 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1299 passim (1975) (discussion of present state
of plain meaning rule).
'8 See Commissioner v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 217 (1984) (duty of court is to find interpre-
tation harmonious with congressional intent); Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., 460 U.S.
103, 118 (1983) (words and statute should be interpreted in light of congressional intent).
"In the interpretation of statutes, the function of the courts is easily states. It is to construe
SEC v. Levine
statute. 9 The court of appeals relied upon Mills v. Electric Auto-
Lite Co." in its decision to hold that Levine's transactions were
voidable rather than void. 1 In Mills, a contract for a merger was
declared voidable at the option of the innocent shareholders.42 It
is submitted that Mills should be distinguished from Levine. In
Mills, the action was brought by minority shareholders. The Mills
Court addressed their rights as innocent parties who were given
misinformation in proxy statements,' whereas the Levine court
addressed the rights of an alleged offender."" Although Mills
holds that contracts in violation of section 29(b) of the Act should
be voidable to protect the innocent party, Mills does not abrogate
section 29(b) when contract rights of a securities law violator
should be considered void.'
the language so as to give effect to the intent of Congress." United States v. American
Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1940). See also Foster v. United States, 303 U.S. 118,
120 (1938) (statute should be interpreted in accordance with legislative intent); Royal In-
dem. Co. v. American Bond & M. Co., 289 U.S. 165, 169 (1933) (same); White v. United
States 191 U.S. 545, 551 (1903) (same). See generally Aleinkoff, Symposium: Patterson v. Mc-
Clean: Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 20, passim (1988) (compares mod-
ern and traditional methods of statutory interpretation).
39 See SEC v. National Executive Planners, Ltd., 503 F. Supp. 1066, 1070 (M.D.N.C.
1980) (Supreme Court repeatedly reminds courts that securities legislation is construed
flexibly to meet congressional purpose); J.1. Case Co., v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964)
(duty of courts to meet congressional purpose). Cf. SEC v. National Sec. Inc., 393 U.S. 453,
463-64 (1969) (where equity demands protection of innocent victim, all essential remedies
should be made available).
0 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
" Levine, 881 F.2d at 1176.
42 Mills, 396 U.S. at 375. In the initial determiniation as to whether the securities laws
were violated, the court looked to the exact wording of the statute but determined that
"void" has been judicially interpreted to "render the contract merely voidable at the op-
tion of the innocent party." Id. at 386-87 (emphasis added).
43 Mills, 396 U.S. at 375. In this case minority shareholders brought a private action to
set aside a merger. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the corpora-
tion and officials violated section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 through
non-disclosure and misrepresentation in a proxy statement that ultimately led to a corpo-
rate merger. Id.
14 See Levine, 689 F. Supp. at 318-19 (Levine was permanently restrained and enjoined
from engaging in fraud or deceit in connection with purchse and sale of securities). The
court stated that in the final judgment, the disgorged assets were representative of illegal
assets. Id.
" See supra note 31 and accompanying text; Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 278 F.2d
783, 792 (8th Cir. 1967) (§ 29(b) should be read as rendering contract voidable at option
of innocent party, but violator cannot enforce own rights); Bankers Life and Casualty Co.
v. Bellanca Corp., 288 F.2d 784, 787 (7th Cir. 1961) ("It is only the contract rights of the
party in violation which are voided."); Kaminsky v. Abrams, 281 F. Supp. 501, 507
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (§ 29(b) only voids rights of violator).
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Significantly, the Mills decision upheld a court of equity's broad
discretionary power to interpret a contract as either void or voida-
ble in order to fashion appropriate equitable remedies."' It is sub-
mitted that the district court in Levine should therefore have been
permitted to utilize broad discretionary power to uphold the
SEC's distribution plan as an equitable remedy.
A. Ascertaining Levine's Property Rights
For the federal government to assert a tax lien, it must first es-
tablish that there is a property interest to which it may attach at
the time of the assessment." Since state law is controlling when
determining property rights, 49 Levine followed New York law,
which directs that a judgment can only be asserted against an as-
signable or transferable property interest."' However, when Le-
vine surrendered the assets to the fund established by the district
court, he no longer had dominion or control over that money and
therefore had no property interest.5" Significantly, the IRS as-
" Mills, 396 U.S. at 386-87. The court concluded that "the guilty party is precluded
from enforcing the contract against an unwilling party . I..." Id  This result stemmed from
"the court's power to grant appropriate remedies." Id. at 391.
A subsequent opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed that "the
SEC may seek other than injunctive relief in order to effectuate the purposes of the Act..
" SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1005 (1971). "[T]he role of equity is 'the instrument for nice adjustment and reconcil-
iation between the public interest and private needs' .... Mills, 396 U.S. at 386.
'7 Levine, 689 F. Supp. at 321-22. The remedy was both equitable and legally appropri-
ate according to the district court judge. Id. The court also recognized that equity dictates
such remedy. Id.
48 See Aquilino, 363 U.S. at 512 (threshold question when federal government asserts tax
lien is whether it had property interest to which a tax lien could attach); Metropolitan Life
Insur. Co. v. United States, 107 F.2d 311, 313 (6th Cir. 1939) (taxes are liens upon all
property, rights to property whether real or personal, belonging to taxpayer) (emphasis
added); Ray E. Nelson Transp. Co. v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 231 F. Supp. 492, 494 (D.C. Neb.
1964) (general tax lien does not attach to property not owned by taxpayer).
"' See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
See Hanrahan v. Albany County Probation Dep't, 119 App. Div. 2d 334, 336, 508
N.Y.S.2d 283, 284 (3d Dep't 1986) (once defendant surrendered money to respondents, he
lost property interest in money); Reich v. Speigel, 208 Misc. 2d 225, 230, 140 N.Y.S.2d
722, 727 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (property sought to be attached must belong to defendant);
Gruenebaum v. Lissauer, 185 Misc. 2d 718, 729, 57 N.Y.S.2d 137, 146, (where creditor
seeks to attach intangible property, it must be owned by debtor), aff d, 270 App. Div. 836,
61 N.Y.S.2d 372 (Sup. Ct. 1945). Cf. Stuhler v. State, 127 Misc. 2d 390, 485 N.Y.S.2d 957,
958 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (corporation convicted of fraud had no interest in funds forfeited to
state for restitution).
"' See United States v. Kings County Iron Works, Inc., 224 F.2d 232, 234 (2d Cir. 1955)
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sessed taxes against Levine for years 1980 through 1982 only after
Levine had consented to a settlement agreement and had actually
disgorged money into the fund.52 Consequently, any subsequent
IRS claim levied against Levine should have been ineffective as to
those funds since Levine had no property interest in the disgorged
money.
B. Imposition of a Constructive Trust
A constructive trust is a legal fiction that imposes an obligation
upon a person who wrongfully obtains property to reconvey it so
as to prevent unjust enrichment." Imposition of a constructive
trust allows the rightful owner to retain the beneficial interest in
the property that has been converted. 55 A court of equity has
broad discretionary power to impose a constructive trust as a
means of defining the extent of the relief afforded by a consent
judgment." Since the district court in Levine was sitting in equity,
(tax lien can be defeated if petitioner establishes that property which government seeks to
attach is not property of taxpayer). See also City of New York v. United States, 283 F.2d
829, 832 (2d Cir. 1960) (statute can only reach property in which taxpayer has interest);
United States v. Lester, 235 F. Supp. 115, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (it is elementary that gov-
ernment may not assert lien against property which taxpayer does not own).
2 See Brief for Appellant Arden Way at 26, SEC v. Levine, 881 F.2d 1165 (2d Cir.
1989) (No. 88-6294) (IRS did not assess Levine's taxes for 1980-1982 until 18 months after
freeze order was instituted by district court).
"Se Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 256 (1978) ("IRS is not given the power to
levy on property in the hands of the taxpayer beyond the extent of the taxpayer's interest
in the property .. "); Atlas, Inc. v. United States, 459 F. Supp. 1000, 1005 (D.N.D. 1978)
(no property interest in embezzled funds to which a tax lien could attach); First Nat'l Bank
of Cartersville v. Hill, 412 F. Supp. 422, 425 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (since no title is acquired by
an embezzler, but rather remains with the victim, "it is clear that the federal tax lien ...
could not attach to any of the subject property..." which the embezzler holds as construc-
tive trustee of owner).
See Sharp v. Kosmalski, 40 N.Y.2d 119, 123, 351 N.E.2d 721, 724, 386 N.Y.S.2d 72,
76 (1976) (purpose of constructive trust is to prevent unjust enrichment); RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TRUSTS comment e (1957) (same).
'" See Brand v. Brand, 811 F.2d 74, 81 (2d Cir. 1987) (constructive trust arises to pre-
vent unjust enrichment when "under such circumstances that in equity and good con-
science he ought not to retain it" (quoting Miller v. Schloss, 218 N.Y. 400, 407, 113 N.E.
337, 339 (1916))); Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 N.Y. 380, 386, 122 N.E.
378, 380 (1919) (holder of legal title is transferred to trustee when he cannot legitimately
retain beneficial interest). See also United States v. Fontana, 528 F. Supp. 137, 145-46
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (interest in property always in person wronged); Simonds v. Simonds, 45
N.Y.2d 233, 242, 280 N.E.2d 189, 194, 408 N.Y.S.2d 359, 364 (1978) (court reached
property wrongfully in hands of innocent party).
" See Scor ON TRUSTS § 462.3 at 3418 (3d ed. 1967) ("where property is held by one
Journal of Legal Commentary Vol. 5: 179, 1989
it was not abusing its discretion in holding that Levine had "bare
legal title" because he obtained the funds through allegedly viola-
tive transactions."7 Therefore, the property interest to the assets
never became vested in Levine because they were held, from the
moment the transaction occurred, in a constructive trust with Le-
vine acting as trustee. 58
The district court's decision to apply a constructive trust pro-
vided proper equitable relief by placing the assets in trust for the
satisfaction of investor claims and acted to prevent Levine from
using the disgorged assets to pay his taxes. 9
person upon constructive trust for another, a court of equity will specifically enforce the
duty of the constructive trustee to convey the property to the other."); see also Dickinson v.
Burnham, 197 F.2d 973, 980 (2d Cir. 1952) (in cases of fraud, court may employ use of
specific performance or damages as grounds for relief), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 875 (1952).
" Levine, 689 F. Supp. at 322. The district court appropriately applied the law and held
that "neither defendant ever had such property interests in the funds to which tax liens
could have attached. Id. Instead, . . .they serve as trustees for the benefit of defrauded
investors." Id. See also United States v. Fontana, 528 F. Supp. 137, 143-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(title to funds was acquired under such circumstances that one may not claim title but must
surrender it). Cf SEC v. Paige, 1985 T.C. (CCH) 9588 (D.D.C. 1985), affd, 810 F.2d 307
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (victim, not embezzler retains rights to funds); Dennis v. United States,
372 F. Supp. 563, 567 (E.D. Va. 1974) (property taken from owner without consent results
in legal ownership remaining unchanged). See generally Libin and Hadon, Embezzled Funds
As Taxable Income: A Study in Judicial Footwork, 61 MICH. L. REv. 425, 439-40 (1963) (one
who misappropriates funds retains no right, title, or interest in funds - funds continue to be
property of victim).
The IRS argues that where, as here, the victim intended to pass legal and beneficial title
to the taxpayer (Levine), a federal lien plainly attaches to the property. See Brief for Appel-
lee at 32, SEC v. Levine, 881 F.2d 1165 (2d Cir. 1989) (No. 88-6294). The IRS further
advances that courts of equity would, in essence, have absolute veto power over intervening
federal tax liens if they could at their discretion impose a constructive trust upon the fraud-
ulently obtained funds. Id.
" See In re General Coffee Corp., 828 F.2d 699, 702 (1 1th Cir. 1987) (court followed
majority approach that constructive trust arises at time when fraudulent transactions oc-
curred), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1007 (1988); Capital Investors Co. v. Executors of Estate of
Morrison, 800 F.2d 424, 427 n.5 (4th Cir. 1986) (constructive trust does not necessarily
arise only at time court so decrees); United States v. Fontana, 528 F. Supp. 137, 143-45
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (equitable principles urge that funds obtained be placed in constructive
trust at time of wrongful action to provide restitution); ScoTr ON TRUSTS, § 462.4 (3d ed.
1967) ("there is no foundation whatever for the notion that a constructive trust does not
arise until it is decreed by a court"). See also Brief for Appellant at 28, SEC v. Levine, 881
F.2d 1165 (2d Cir. 1989) (No. 88-6284) (Commission argues "constructive trust arises at
the time of the wrongdoing, the defendants never obtained more than bare legal title;
therefore, no tax lien could attach to their illegal profits").
" See Burgess v. Premier Corp., 727 F.2d 826, 838-39 (9th Cir. 1984) ("to simply sub-
tract the tax benefit would place an unfair burden on taxpayers generally" and does not
meet recessionary purpose of damages, as wrongdoer benefits); Greenman v. United States,
711 F. Supp. 1556, 1559 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (funds should not be used to satisfy tax obligation
of wrongdoer).
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C. The Effect of a Consent Judgment
A court of equity can fashion a remedy in the nature of dis-
gorgement even though a case is not litigated.60 A consent judg-
ment is a judicial approval of the parties' agreement entered into
after settlement negotiations.61 Settlement agreements resulting in
consent judgments present advantages to both parties because the
order is both enforceable and expeditiously obtained.62 These set-
tlement agreements have been developed to avoid the great-cost
of SEC litigation at the public's expense.6" Furthermore, the con-
sent judgment, when entered, is considered a final judgment that
0 See BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS, § 81, at 295 (5th ed. 1973) ("attitude of equity is the
same where there is an appropriation of the property of another which does not amount to
a crime but rather merely to the tort of conversion."); cf. Maryland Nat'l Bank v. Tower,
374 F.2d 381, 384 (4th Cir. 1967) ("equitable duty to convey depends not alone upon the
enrichment of the one upon whom it is imposed, but also upon the equivalent detriment
which would be suffered by the claimant"); Simonds v. Simonds, 45 N.Y.2d 233, 242, 380
N.E.2d 189, 194, 408 N.Y.S.2d 359, 364 (1978) (not necessary that person commit wrong-
ful act in order to be unjustly enriched).
" BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 756 (5th ed. 1979). "A judgment, the provisions and terms
of which are settled and agreed to by the parties to the action." Id. People v. Colorado City
Lot Owners, 108 111. App. 3d 266, 276, 438 N.E.2d 1273, 1279-80 (1982) (consent judg-
ment is result of an independent undertaking by parties to reach settlement agreements);
See Matthews v. Looney, 132 Tex. 313, 317, 123 S.W.2d 871, 872 (1939) ("It is elementary
that a judgment by consent is one the terms and provisions of which are settled and agreed
upon by the parties.").
2 See United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681 (1971) (consent decree is com-
promise in which each party loses an opportunity that might have been attained in litiga-
tion); Matthews, Effective Defense of SEC Investigations: Laying the Foundation for Successful
Disposition of Subsequent Civil, Administrative and Criminal Proceedings, 24 EMORY L.J. 567,
584-85 (1975) (outlines investigative process and stipulates what is required before issuing a
complaint). See also Ferrara, SEC Division of Trading and Markets: Detection, Investigation and
Enforcement of Selected Practices that Impair Investor Confidence in the Capital Markets, 16 How.
L.J. 950, 964-65 (1971) (allocation of SEC's resources in investigating violations and how
SEC determines when violation exists). See generally Jacobs, supra note 25, at 413-17 (de-
tailed discussion on judicial remedies available in both contested and uncontested SEC
cases).
13 See Thomforde, supra note 2, at 238 (consent decrees are less expensive and less time
consuming for small SEC staff than litigation and respondent avoids disciplinary hearing);
Matthews, supra note 63, at 623-24 (1975) (violations create numerous adverse effects on
market); Brief of Appellant at 34, SEC v. Levine, 881 F.2d 1165 (2d Cir. 1989) (No. 88-
6294) ("The agreement enabled Levine to settle his $35.4 million potential exposure for
securities violations in the Commission's action, by disgorging less than $12 million."); see
also Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1, 44-47 (1980) (in-
sider trading adversely effects market); Report of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion's Advisory Committee on Enforcement Policies & Practices (SEC, June 1, 1972), re-
printed in Matthews, Finkelstein & Milstein, ENFORCEMENT AND LITIGATION UNDER THE
FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS 275 et seq. (P.L.I.1973) (committee report expressly encouraged
settlements).
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bars relitigation under the doctrine of collateral estoppel." Upon
entry of a consent judgment, the court has a duty to construe the
consent within the four corners of the parties' agreement." More-
over, the entry of a consent judgment is a judicial act whereby the
court adjudicates the plaintiff's right to relief and the extent of
that relief.6"
In Levine, by agreeing to enter into a judgment by consent, both
Levine and the SEC waived their right to litigate the merits of the
case.6" Although the consent judgment was entered into without
admitting or denying the allegations of the complaint, the district
court had judicial power to fashion an appropriate remedy.68 The
See Blue Chips Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 742 (1975) (parties to
consent decree are collaterally estopped in future proceeding); Nashville, Chattanooga &
St. L. Ry. v. United States, 113 U.S. 261, 266 (1885) (consent decree is bar to suit by
consenting parties); Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20, 27 (1882) (judgment entered by
consent is binding on parties); Corcoran v. Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co., 94 U.S. 741,
744 (1876) (consent judgment which embodies parties' compromise becomes law that par-
ties are bound by, and subsequent suit is precluded); Gilbert v. United States, 479 F.2d
1267, 1267 (2d Cir. 1973) (settlement agreed to by all parties and entered as judgment
cannot be set aside even if one party claims he was coerced by his adviser); SEC v. Thermo-
dynamics, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 1380, 1382 (D. Colo. 1970) (consent decree has same effect as
any other decree). See generally Thomforde, supra note 2, at 273 (1977) (factors that influ-
ence parties to settle).
" See United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 236-37 (1975) (con-
sent decree construed as contract without reference to legislation sought to be enforced);
United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681-82 (1971) (scope of consent decree must
be discerned within its four corners, and not by reference to what might satisfy purpose of
one of parties to it); Washington Asphalt Co. v. Harold Kaeser Co., 51 Wash. 2d 89, 91,
316 P.2d 126, 127 (1957) (consent judgment is construed as contract between parties).
In accordance with the contractual nature of the consent, both the district court and the
court of appeals attempted to construe the consent within its four corners. Levine, 689 F.
Supp. at 321.
" United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681-82 (1971) (consent judgment is
judicial function and act which carries legal obligation that court establishes on facts). See
Thermodynamics, Inc., 319 F. Supp. at 1382, affd, 464 F.2d 457 (10th Cir., 1972), cert. de-
nied, 410 U.S. 927 (1973). The court is "adjudicating the plaintiff's rights to relief and its
extent, both of which are essential elements of any judgment." Id. Accord Juliard & Co. v.
Johnson, 166 F. Supp. 577, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (consent decree has same force as any
judgment). See also United States v. Carter Prods., 211 F. Supp. 144, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1962)
("if a consent decree will afford substantially the same relief that could be available after a
hearing .... it should be adopted.").
"' Levine, 689 F. Supp. at 321-23. See also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723, 749 (1975) (consent not enforceable directly or in collateral proceedings by those
who are not parties to action even though they were intended to benefit by it). Foote v.
Parsons Non-Skid Co., 196 F. 951, 954 (6th Cir. 1912) (settlement or compromise between
original parties may upon discretion of court shut off any right of intervention by third
party).
" Levine, 881 F.2d at 1169. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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district court's exercise of discretion provided a means of deter-
ring further actions such as those here alleged, prevented Levine
from receiving the benefit of paying his taxes out of the disgorged
assets and provided restitution to the investors.69 It is submitted
that the Court of Appeal's contrary holding undermines the set-
tlement purpose and is more likely to fill the courts with unneces-
sary litigation at the taxpayer's expense.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals' decision in Levine restricts the enforce-
ment authority of the SEC to regulate markets by allowing the
IRS to preempt the SEC's discretion. If the consent judgment to
which Levine agreed is not afforded judicial deference, the bene-
fits and purpose of the SEC's expedient negotiations will be lost.
The district court's determination that property rights never
vested in Levine and the imposition of a constructive trust were
reasonable and appropriate remedies. The measures taken by the
district court clearly satisfied the conscience of equity.
Maria Credle & Arnold F. Mascali
Id. at 322. "Thus two goals are achieved: the first is restitution to injured investors
and the second is preventing Levine . . . from enjoying personal gain in the form of pay-
ment of [his] tax liabilities .. " Id.
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